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Introduction 
In microeconomics, industrial organization, and public economics handbooks1, 
natural monopoly is described as a situation in which, for structural reasons, only one firm 
finds it profitable to produce in the market; the diagrams used are similar to the following. 
 
In the first edition of Samuelson’s handbook (1948), and until the end of the 1970s, 
natural monopoly was considered to occur in cases of scale economies2; as we know, with 
these average costs decline when output increases throughout the entire range of market 
demand. In this literature, economies of scale were attributed to high fixed costs and low 
or zero variable costs; they were also considered a barrier to entry. Due to the monopoly 
power derived from it, natural monopoly was seen as a market failure, and Government 
intervention was required (in the forms of nationalization, regulation, or antitrust)3. 
This theory has been criticized. For example, part of the Austrian monopoly theory 
denies the existence of non-legal barriers to entry4. However, the most influential criticism 
came from a number of articles published in the 1970s – dealing with natural monopoly in 
                                                 
1 For Microeconomics see Kreps (1990: 302); for Industrial Organization see Cabral (2000: 75), for Public 
Economics see  Stiglitz (2000: 291). 
2 “Some of the basic factors responsible for monopoly are inherent in the economies of large-scale 
production” (Samuelson 1948: 40). 
3 See the interesting contribution on the history of the treatment of natural monopoly in introductory 
textbooks by Ulbrich (1991). 
4 Actually, monopoly theory is one of the most controversial areas in Austrian economics. In short, there are 
three different views: 1. Mises and Kirzner; 2. Rothbard and Armentano; 3. O’Driscoll. Although this is not 
the place to analyze these views, we can say that not all of them deny the existence of natural monopoly. 
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multiple output production5 – and from the theory of “contestable markets”6. They caused 
a radical change in the definition of natural monopoly. Nowadays it means a situation 
characterized by the sub-additivity of cost functions (production costs less if it is done by 
one firm only), and by sustainability (entry is not profitable). Not only does this new 
theory demonstrate that scale economies do not help us to define natural monopoly 
properly, but also that they alone may not constitute a barrier to entry7. It implies that “if 
there is a free entry, this will prevent the monopolist from setting high prices, as they 
would trigger entry” (Motta 2004: 70). The systematization of the new viewpoint on 
natural monopoly was carried out by  Sharkey (1982). 
But apparently the story does not end here. There have also been strong criticisms 
of the new theory. Shepherd, for example, radically claims that the theory of contestable 
markets “has been mainly a detour” (1995: 299)8. In short, we can summarize the present 
state of research as follows: if there are economies of scale with sunk costs, as in the cases 
previously considered as natural monopolies, the behavior of the potential entrant and the 
reaction of the incumbent are now seen as depending on the strategic context in which 
they operate. In general, recent models show that monopoly power might persist under 
free entry, and market mechanisms might not prevent a monopolist from exercising 
market power (Motta 2004: 2.6) 
The purpose of this article is to begin writing the history of the concept of natural 
monopoly, and of its policy implications. While it would certainly be very interesting to 
inquire into the reasons and the consequences of the change that this concept underwent 
in the 1970s, this paper focuses on the reconstruction of its origins, long before 
Samuelson’s first edition. Very few studies have been devoted to this topic. We have 
found some synthetic reconstruction of the initial history of natural monopoly in Sharkey 
(1982, ch. 2)9, Hazlett (1985), and DiLorenzo (1996); there are hints in Ekelund and Hébert 
(1981), O’Driscoll (1982) and Stigler (1982); we can also cite Ekelund and Hébert (2003), 
                                                 
5 The question of multiproduct natural monopoly was dealt with from 1977 by Baumol, Bayley, Panzar, and 
Willig. 
6 The idea of contestability was dealt with in a series of articles from 1980 by Baumol, Bayley, Panzar, and 
Willig. See for all Baumol, Panzar and Willig (1982). 
7 There are actually two definition of entry barriers in the literature, one proposed by Bain, the other by 
Stigler. As Schmalensee points out “An updated Bain definition would not rule out scale economies as an 
antitrust barrier to entry when sunk costs are important, while the Stigler definition would” (2004: 471). 
8 And he adds: “The theory is internally inconsistent, difficult to relate to reality, and hazardous for policy 
treatments of market power” (Shepherd 1995: 300). 
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who deals with the theory of Dupuit and of Walras, and Béraud (2004), mainly focused on 
Walras10. The secondary literature is therefore rather scarce. 
But the main reason why we think it is worthwhile to make a new contribution to it 
doesn’t lie in its scarcity; it lies rather in a source of confusion that we think needs to be 
revised. The confusion derives from the fact that the concept of natural monopoly is 
composed of different elements and, as is shown in this article, every element has its own 
different history. We are therefore dealing with a complex concept, requiring a separate 
analysis of the particular paths followed by its various components. In other words, we 
think that an accurate historical analysis of the notion of natural monopoly cannot be 
written without breaking it down into all its component parts. In this paper we have 
identified the following features which go to make up that notion: 1. the expression itself; 
2. the singling out of the concrete situations to which it is applied; 3. the inquiry into 
economies of scale; 4. the consideration of their compatibility with competition; 5. the 
drawing of the diagram; 6. the request for Government intervention. If each of these 
elements is not considered separately, it is hard to correctly identify original contributions, 
and to properly reconstruct the influence of ideas. Hence, in every section of the paper, 
each of the above features is separately examined from a historical perspective, 
highlighting the originality of economic theories in that specific respect, as well as the way 
those theories influenced one another. 
The approach mostly followed by this paper is known as “rational reconstruction”: 
we extract from the whole of the economists’ work those parts concerning the different 
elements composing the traditional notion of natural monopoly, with the aim of finding 
out priorities and influences. We are aware of the limits of this perspective, and we 
sometimes suggest some interpretation and contextualization, but our main purpose here 
is to take only a first step, clarifying the confusion we mentioned above, and thus 
providing a sound basis for a further “historical reconstruction”, which will be our next 
task. 
Our investigation ends with the formulation of the concept of natural monopoly as it 
was in the traditional view, although the new developments of the theory after the 1970s 
                                                                                                                                                                  
9 Sharkey (1982: 15) also cites Lowry (1973). 
10 All these works will be recalled later in the paper. 
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will be taken into account during the examination of the economists’ thought, and some 
reflections related to the new view will be also discussed in the conclusion. 
 
1. The expression “natural” monopoly 
Aristotle was the first to talk about monopoly (De Roover 1951: 492; Langholm 
2006: 397), but who was the first to talk about “natural” monopoly? When did this 
expression start being used in its current sense? And why was the word “natural” 
employed? This is what we look at in this section. We limit our analysis here to the 
meaning and the definition of natural monopoly; the identification of its distinctive 
features by the economists under analysis will be discussed in the next sections. 
Smith never uses the expression “natural monopoly”, but he gives a detailed 
description of the characteristics of what this was to be called immediately after him: 
“Some natural productions require such a singularity of soil and situation, that all the land 
in a great country … may not be sufficient to supply the effectual demand”; the 
consequent “enhancements of the market price are evidently the effect of natural causes 
which may hinder the effectual demand from being fully supplied, and which may 
continue, therefore, to operate forever”(1776: I.7.24). The earliest explicit use of the term 
that I have found in the literature is in the essay The Nature of Rent by Malthus, where 
natural monopoly is distinguished from artificial monopoly. For Malthus there are: 
“peculiar products of the earth … which may be called natural and necessary monopolies” 
([1815] 1969: 13). As an example of natural monopolies, he takes “certain vineyards in 
France, which, from the peculiarity of their soil and situation, exclusively yield wine of a 
certain flavour” (13-14)11. The expression turns up again in Bastiat, who wrote: “People 
who class together artificial monopoly and what they call natural monopoly … are quite 
blind or quite superficial” ([1850] 1864: 180). So far, we have seen that classical economists 
did use the expression natural monopoly, but we haven’t found a definition of the concept 
yet. This is supplied by J.S. Mill, who explains that natural monopolies are “those which 
are created by circumstances, and not by law” ([1848] 149: 499). In general we can say that 
the expression was used to indicate those cases of monopoly deriving from natural agents 
supplied in fixed quantity, also including talent and location (Cairnes 1861). Economists 
always regarded them favorably. Hence, we think that the reason for the use of the 
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